Wittgenstein’s Ontology
It seems that Wittgenstein’s Ontology can be approached from various “sides of the philosophical hill.” I could start explaining it in pure being-and-stuff terms: that the “stuff” of this world is sufficiently atomic. Atomic, here referring to “simple” indivisible, non-complex or non-compounded entities. Whoever knows whatever each atomic entity is is irrelevant.
Now, how Wittgenstein gets to atomism isn’t a matter of empiricism or particle accelerator-colliders. There’s a parallel world which he sees necessarily requiring metaphysical atomism: semantic atomism. Maybe I should back up a bit. There is another “hill” by which Wittgenstein approaches his atomic conclusion. Human language is a very flexible thing. It’s not like machine-code, where each and every operator and label is important to the point of system-crashing. Human language also isn’t like code, since it is filled with vagaries, nuance. What human language presents itself as is a weird mix of names, relations, actions and general fluff.
Names are significant entities, otherwise known as “terms.” They’re a handy connection between language and physical, empirical reality. They are usually as clear and present as a stop-sign is (and if they’re not, well, they can be made to be so by simple presentation of the ‘thing’ they represent). Names, as signs, are just like those silly metaphysical atomic entities — simple, and undecomposable (who knew that was an actual word!) in meaning. Sure, we could try and decompose “unicorn” into words (through descriptors), for instance “A unicorn is a white horse, with a single straight, pointy horn on it’s nose, like a narwhal.” But such a description (however accurate or precise) is hardly a decomposition.. it’s really just pointing me towards the possible idea or possible reality of a unicorn, but not in any real way pointing a unicorn out. Put another way, descriptions are really good filters and painters, but really bad labels or signs.
So that’s the majority of the tough-stuff. After the clarification of what atomism is, I really just see worlds parallel to our own, in logical space and/or in language-space. And speaking of logic, Wittgenstein views the relationship of these atomic entities as logically oriented. The world’s content is atomic, so the world’s form (like language’s form) can also be parallel, and like science tries to find out the precise nature of nature, the form of nature is spelled out in logic. I may have presented logic here as secondary, contingent or as “accidental”, but really, logic is the third “way” up the philosophical hill of Wittgenstein’s ontology — were you to start with logic, Wittgenstein would expect you to also end up with atomism.
Word count: 431.


