Wittgenstein and sentences in the mind
For all of Wittgenstein’s initial claim to “solving the problems of philosophy,” it seems his unclarity of form and content is only leading to a reframing of further problems.
Thus far, I have nearly checked out into my own prejudices of mental acts & ontology. Patience only lasts so long, and for philosophers, near infinite patience is required. Upon my personal lack, I often find regression to my own ideas when another speaks over and over and over, saying nothing which is helpful to clarify the described circumstance.
Particularly for Wittgenstein, like most philosophers, the mind-body problem exists more in terms of names & their referents. On some base level, most of us see no point behind attempting to understand the conditions required for our brain to know what another is talking about when they say “my car.” Somewhere along the way, in early childhood development, language happened upon us, and here we are involved and embodying it. Certainly various sociologists want to know if language is “caught” from parents, but sadly some post-Chomskian studies show an in-born affinity.
Anyways, Wittgenstein comes upon us and decides to descend into the nether-regions of our brain, and claim that words aren’t much of anything until a knowing, understanding subject comes along and picks them up. Personally, at this point I wonder how voluntary the mind is. The traditional example of “don’t think of a white elephant” is often used– and when I sit in Starbucks, I am disattentive to my own studies in lieu of the gibberish thrust upon me by the next seat over. Ahh the joy of public life.
Back to Wittgenstein. For all his introductory remarks of “propositions” and “facts” it seems he begins to back-track and almost psychologize (gack!) the whole of communicative life. “Oh wait, when I said propositions, I didn’t mean the words like you reasonably assumed I meant! Those are just the propositional-signs! The proposition is in your head!” And wordless thoughts, like the song melody you can’t get out of your head, are created in a pre-expressive land of personal, mental creativity. To explicate Wittgenstein’s position, I should advocate a picture:
Speaker:Mind->land-of-thoughts->speech-acts (expressions/propositional signs) … land-of-invisible, silent, unexpressed representations -> Mind:Listener.
All this is still nearly insane in terms of getting anyone any closer to understanding Mind. Sure “in our mind’s eye” there are lots of pictures, assumed reconstructions running idyllically parallel to the world, but there are hardly any required ontological status of thoughts. Wittgenstein explicitly states that thoughts aren’t simply facts, but pictures of facts. Thoughts, thereby have no representative sign to hide behind. In some real terms, the mind’s nonverbal creative ability mixed with “a picture is worth a thousand words” is how Wittgenstein gets to this “picture theory of sense.”
If I’ve entirely lost any & everyone by now, I simply mean that from a picture (even what we see) a high number of propositions could be expressed. And from these propositional-signs, another high number of pictures can be constructed silently, wordlessly in the mind.
Word Count: 501:
footnote: if confusion and anger show through, it’s more related to tonight’s inane night-class more than Wittgenstein. I do however consider the Wittgenstein discussions to be mildly repetitious. I suppose I’m just impatient, as noted above.
